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Abstract
Power, rule, and legitimacy have always been core concerns of political science. In the 
1970s, when governability appeared to be problematic, legitimacy was discussed both in 
the context of policy research and by critics of the capitalist state. More recently inter-
est turned to governance beyond the nation-state. The legitimacy of transnational (i.e., 
European and international) organizations, of international regimes and of the – hard 
or soft – law they formulate is held to be deficient because they are lacking in demo-
cratic legitimation. This discussion only rarely refers to Max Weber. This paper tries to 
show that returning to Max Weber can clarify some points in the discussion of legiti-
macy and compliance beyond the nation-state. Relating the alternatives to democratic 
legitimation to Weber’s concept of legal legitimacy throws a new light on the presumed 
legitimacy deficit in transnational governance that makes it appear less dramatic. With 
Max Weber we can also develop a more sanguine view of the consequences of legitimacy 
deficits for compliance.
Zusammenfassung
Macht, Herrschaft und Legitimität waren immer zentrale Themen der Politikwissen-
schaft. Als in den Siebzigerjahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts Regierbarkeit zum Problem 
wurde, befasste man sich mit Legitimität als wichtiger Ressource des Nationalstaats. 
Neuerdings hat sich das politikwissenschaftliche Interesse auf Fragen des Regierens jen-
seits des Nationalstaats erweitert. Die Legitimität transnationalen, europäischen ebenso 
wie globalen Regierens erscheint aufgrund mangelhafter demokratischer Legitimierung 
defizitär. Diese Diskussion bezieht sich selten auf Max Weber. Dieses Papier will zeigen, 
dass die Bezugnahme auf Max Weber einen Beitrag zur Diskussion über Legitimität 
und Compliance jenseits des Nationalstaats leisten kann. Aus der Perspektive von We-
bers Begriff legaler Legitimität betrachtet, erscheinen die in der Literatur erörterten 
Alternativen zu demokratischer Legitimierung weniger defizitär und die Folgen eines 
vermeintlichen Legitimitätsdefizits für Compliance weniger dramatisch.
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1 Legitimacy: The concept
Power, rule, and legitimacy have always been core concerns of political science. However, 
as Suchman (1995: 572) observes, “(m)any researchers employ the term legitimacy, but 
few define it.” If it is defined, reference is mostly made to Max Weber and his definition 
of the three types of legitimate domination. For Weber, the systematic empiricist and 
action theorist, a social order is legitimate if it is held to be binding and exemplary; 
it is the belief in the exemplary and binding nature of a social order that constitutes 
legitimacy, whether this is the order of marriage or of political rule (Weber 1956: 26). 
The legitimating belief attributes the right to make binding decisions to some person or 
institution, and constitutes at the same time the normative (moral) obligation of speci-
fied subjects to comply, irrespective of the costs or benefits accruing to them if they do. 
Though this is often not done, the social scientist should insist on Weber’s definition: 
legitimacy is a belief, an empirical phenomenon to be established as other socially rel-
evant subjective phenomena, and not something to be inferred from compliant behav-
ior nor deduced from the presence or absence of its presumable determinants. Whether 
a legitimating belief is widely shared or not is an empirical question of great practical 
importance, but need not be included in the very definition of legitimacy.
In the 1970s, when governability appeared to be problematic, legitimacy was discussed 
both in the context of policy research and by critics of the capitalist state. Policy re-
searchers were concerned about the directive capacity (Steuerungsfähigkeit) of govern-
ment and discussed its prerequisites (Mayntz 1975; Mayntz/Scharpf 1975). Among 
the prerequisites of an active policy stance, political support was seen to play a crucial 
role – support of the given political system, of a specific government, and “of specific 
policy decisions, expressed in the willingness to comply with them” (Mayntz/Scharpf 
1975: 21). Legitimacy was seen as one possible source, or motive of support, but it was 
realized that legitimacy is potentially scarce. Legitimacy deficits were highlighted by 
critics of the capitalist state. Offe (1972) and Habermas (1973) agreed that the need for 
legitimacy had increased dramatically with the interventionist stance of the state that 
resulted from attempts to contain the economic crisis inherent in a capitalist economy. 
State interventionism led to spiraling demands which governments were increasingly 
unable to meet. However, the growing legitimacy deficit was not simply attributed to 
the inability of governments to meet popular demands. Referring back to Max Weber, 
Habermas argued that the belief in legitimacy depends on claims that must be accepted 
as truth (Habermas 1973: 133–136), but that truth claims became increasingly precari-
ous; his crisis of legitimacy is basically a crisis of culture.
This text is the revised version of a paper originally written for presentation at the conference “Law 
and Legitimacy in the Governance of Transnational Economic Relations” that took place at the Villa 
Vigoni, June 22–24, 2008. I profited greatly from the discussion at this conference and from subse-
quent comments by Fritz W. Scharpf and Wolfgang Streeck.
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Implicitly or explicitly, the discussion in the 1970s referred to the modern, capitalist 
nation-state. With European integration and the advent of “global governance,” gover-
nance theory expanded to include governance beyond the nation-state. In the literature 
on global governance, which is generally of an institutionalist rather than realist bent, 
reference is often made to legitimacy. The legitimacy of transnational (i.e., European 
and international) organizations, of international regimes and of the – hard or soft – 
law they formulate is held to be deficient because they are lacking in democratic legiti-
mation, and this is perceived as a problem for transnational governance. This discussion 
only rarely refers to Max Weber. In what follows I try to show that returning to Max We-
ber can clarify some points in the discussion of legitimacy and compliance beyond the 
nation-state. Relating the alternatives to democratic legitimation to Weber’s concept of 
legal legitimacy throws a new light on the presumed legitimacy deficit in transnational 
governance that makes it appear less dramatic. With Max Weber we can also develop a 
more sanguine view of the consequences of legitimacy deficits for compliance.
2 Legal legitimacy
The claim to legitimacy and the belief in it can have different bases. Max Weber, we 
know, distinguished between traditional, charismatic, and legal legitimacy (Weber 1956: 
157–182). Legalization is a pervasive, often noted trend at all political levels (Voigt 1980; 
Zürn/Zangl 2004), and legal legitimacy is therefore assumed to be the prevalent form 
of legitimacy in the modern world. This assumption is likely to be correct as far as the 
legitimacy claim of political institutions and of corporate actors established in confor-
mity with the law is concerned, but it need not be true for the legitimating beliefs held by 
their subjects. There need be no correspondence between the basis on which legitimacy 
is claimed by an authority and the legitimating belief motivating its acceptance. Often 
legal norms are accepted as binding because a charismatic political leader formulates 
them or because they are the appropriate, time-hallowed way of doing things. For We-
ber it was obvious that, in real life, legitimating beliefs have different bases; in modern 
constitutional states and in legal theory, legality is assumed to be the prime basis of le-
gitimacy. Though it would be interesting to test this assumption empirically, this is not 
the purpose here. We turn instead to the problem of the dual nature of legal legitimacy.
For Max Weber, legitimacy based on legality is rational legitimacy. In the literature, 
legitimacy based on legality is in fact widely called “legal-rational,” rather than sim-
ply legal. Johannes Winckelmann (1952: 38–39, 60–61) has argued at length that for 
Weber, legal authority meant not only formal legality, but included value rationality 
(Wertrationalität).1 Strictly speaking, value rationality means that an action or decision 
is in agreement with specific, historically or culturally defined values; in discussions of 
1 Weber himself did not explicitly distinguish between formal legality and value rationality.
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legal legitimacy, “value rational” is taken to refer to the content or substance, the “what” 
rather than the “how” of a policy. A decision would then possess legal legitimacy if it 
is arrived at in a procedurally correct fashion and if it meets material or substantive 
criteria. In German legal theory, this dual nature of legality has long been discussed in 
connection with the notion of Rechtsstaat, which is seen to consist of formal and mate-
rial elements, the material aspect being closely linked to ideas of justice (Schulze-Fielitz 
in Dreier 2006: 198–199). The combination of formal (procedural) and substantive 
rationality is often found in definitions of legitimacy; examples are the definition of 
legitimate rules by Huckel (2007: 120) and the definition of “moral legitimacy” by Such-
man (1995: 579–581). 
Acknowledging the dual nature of legal legitimacy raises the question of the relationship 
between formal (procedural) legality and substantive rationality. In normative concepts 
of legal legitimacy, both are seen to be causally connected: a specific procedure is as-
sumed to generate substantively rational decisions or policies. In this case, legitimacy is 
given if the formal procedure used to generate decisions or policies meets specific crite-
ria. According to Luhmann, formal procedures in adjudication and in political decision-
making that grant equal and objective rights to everyone can confer legitimacy because 
they guarantee everyone the chance of getting a satisfactory decision outcome and of 
having everyone’s interests taken into account (Luhmann 1969: 30). In empirical reality, 
however, a procedure that grants equal and objective rights to everyone does not guaran-
tee the substantive rationality of decisions. Following Winckelmann’s interpretation of 
Weber’s concept of legal legitimacy, both mere formal legality as well as “justice” rendered 
by illegal means would be considered to lack legitimacy: procedure and outcome must 
both be valued positively, but their evaluation may well rest on different sets of values.
In real life, different criteria are in fact often used to evaluate the formal and the ma-
terial aspects of legitimacy. Authorities believed to be legally legitimate, because they 
have been established by and use accepted procedures, can make decisions that are not 
perceived as substantively legitimate. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) presum-
ably claims compliance with the “conditionality” it imposes on creditors on the basis of 
legality. The creditors may not question the formal legality of the conditions imposed 
upon them, but substantively they often hold them to be unjust and do not feel morally 
obliged to comply with them. In fact, rules and decisions can be considered binding 
because they were made following an established procedure of due process2 or because 
they are in agreement with widely shared values and are felt to be just. On the one hand, 
there is some empirical evidence for the claim that formal legality as such can confer 
legitimacy; Stryker (2001: 8702), for instance, refers to an empirical study that shows 
that the assessment of decision-making procedures as fair is more important for the 
perceived legitimacy of the US Congress than the substantive agreement between poli-
cies adopted by Congress and the respondents’ self-interested preferences. On the oth-
2 The concept of due process plays an important role specifically in US legal discourse; see 
Wasserman (2004).
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er, governments as well as national and international organizations often justify their 
policy preferences, decisions, and administrative acts by reference not to legality, but to 
values (Halliday/Block-Lieb/Carruthers 2010). Such justification need not be merely 
tactical; it may express genuine normative conviction. But in modern societies multiple 
conflicting values co-exist: there are arguments for freedom as well as for equality, for 
shareholder value as well as for stakeholder value, for segregation as well as for integra-
tion. Legitimacy claims either try to connect to widely shared values or cater deliber-
ately to minority preferences. In modern society we are therefore faced with a plurality 
of value-based legitimacy claims that reflect the existing diversity of value orientations. 
In practice, then, formal legality and material rationality can diverge. Occasionally the 
formal and the material elements of legality (and the legal state) are even seen to be op-
posed to each other (Weber 2007: 736). 
In the course of the development of modern (Western) society, the sovereign people 
have become the only normatively accepted source of legitimacy for political decisions. 
The rules that guide democratic decision-making constitute the now dominant kind 
of legal-rational legitimacy (Willke 2007: 46). Max Weber did not discuss democratic 
legitimacy, but it is implicitly included in his category Legalität kraft Vereinbarung, one 
of the two possible bases of legal legitimacy he distinguished (Weber 1956: 198). Like 
all forms of legal legitimacy, democratic legitimacy has a formal and a material aspect. 
Irrespective of concrete decision outcomes, the very concept of (procedural) democracy 
contains the guarantee of highly valued, fundamental individual rights, including po-
litical and legal equality, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and respect of minor-
ity positions. For this reason, democratic procedures can be valued for themselves. The 
crucial issue is whether formally democratic decision processes will also lead to sub-
stantively rational policy decisions. In theoretically exacting conceptions of democracy 
this is assumed. Where democratic procedures lead to a discourse free of domination 
(herrschaftsfreier Diskurs; Habermas 1992), decisions considered just by all are assumed 
to result: the substantive rationality of binding decisions follows from the possibility of 
public deliberation. Democratic procedures can be thought to generate substantive ra-
tionality also from a systems perspective; thus a democratic constitution, by including 
the whole demos, makes it possible to solve socio-economic conflicts by using accepted 
procedural forms. The legitimacy claim of democratic regimes rests on the assumption 
that a procedure that itself embodies important values ensures that substantively ratio-
nal, binding decisions will be made. In practice, however, political regimes are already 
called democratic if the major formal elements of democracy are met, even if they do 
not always produce decisions that are in the common interest. Majority preferences 
may favor ineffective rather than effective policy decisions. The flaws of and the dan-
gers inherent in the formal procedures of democracy have been widely discussed in the 
literature (see already Scharpf 1970 for a review). These flaws have motivated measures 
to counter them but have not detracted from the conviction that, in modern nation-
states, political legitimacy must be based on democratic procedures – if only because 
the sovereign people in a democracy can withdraw its support from a government that 
meets with widespread dissatisfaction. 
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3 Alternative forms of legal legitimacy in transnational governance
If the argument is accepted that democratic procedures, i.e., a representative democracy 
is the best way to ensure substantively rational policy decisions, then the legal legitimacy 
of governance beyond the nation-state cannot be but deficient. In fact, transnational 
governance is widely considered to be impaired by the absence or weakness of demo-
cratic procedures of decision-making at the European level and beyond: supranational 
institutions are not held accountable to voters; they lack sanctioning power; there is no 
European, let alone global demos; and there are few institutionalized forms for the di-
rect expression of popular preferences (Scharpf 1999; Menon/Weatherill 2008). If only 
democracy can legitimate power, then, as more power accrues to transnational institu-
tions, the greater the overall legitimacy deficit must become.
In international governance in general, and in the multi-level polity of the EU in particu-
lar, states are mainly addressed and held to comply. This makes for a two-level structure 
of legitimation, where the consensus among national governments enjoying democratic 
legitimacy is normatively expected to legitimize European and international decisions. 
But there are doubts that the formal, democratic legitimacy of national governments 
does in fact carry over into transnational policy decisions. Besides, the legitimacy of 
transnational political intervention is increasingly precarious as “the direct influence of 
national governments – and most notably of national legislatures – on the shaping of 
international law in general or international law decisions has been reduced” (Wolfrum 
2008: 2044). Much thought is therefore given to possibilities to strengthen or introduce 
elements of democratic legitimacy into transnational governance directly (Held 1995; 
Archibugi 2004; Held/Koenig-Archibugi 2005). 
Attempts to “mimic national political structures and processes” beyond the nation-state 
are held to be impracticable (Menon/Weatherill 2008: 399); a “universal parliament” in 
the framework of the UN is even considered undesirable (Müller 2008). The structural 
features underlying international bodies make attempts to install an enlarged replica of 
national institutions futile. Even the EU is unlikely to turn into a representative democ-
racy enjoying the legal power to tax citizens and to enforce compliance. But in line with 
Weber’s definition, a direct or representative democracy is not the only procedural basis 
for legal legitimacy. In fact, at the transnational level of governance alternative forms of 
legitimation play a crucial role. 
Following ideas expressed by Habermas (1992), deliberation is frequently seen as a 
form of legitimation practiced and practicable beyond the nation-state; deliberation 
is even considered a special form of democracy (“deliberative democracy”; see Elster 
1998; Dryzek 2006; Höreth 2009). It is not unusual that procedures that legitimate, 
though they are not democratic in the strictly procedural sense, are subsumed under 
the concept of democracy; thus Héritier (2003) includes associative and expert repre-
sentation in policy networks as well as horizontal mutual control among EU member 
states among the different forms of democratic legitimation in the composite European 
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democracy. Neyer (2009) speaks of the need to adapt the “orthodox” concept of de-
mocracy to the reality of governance beyond the nation-state and redefines the “demos” 
in transnational democracy as those affected by a given decision, thus conflating par-
ticipation with majoritarian democracy. However, going back to the Weberian concept 
of legal-rational legitimacy, the justification of decisions by argument implied in the 
notion of deliberation should be considered not as a form of, but as an alternative to 
actually practiced democratic procedures.
Participation by representatives of organized groups of “stakeholders” in sector-specific 
decision processes is an alternative to formally democratic procedures closely related 
to deliberation. To take legitimacy as given if those subject to a regulation participate 
in devising it (see Willke 2007: 45) fits Weber’s category of legality based on consensus 
(Vereinbarung) just as well as representative democracy does. Provided opposing views 
are taken into account in the process, such participation can lead to decisions accepted 
as appropriate, i.e., substantively rational. Participation by stakeholder representatives 
may appear to follow the basic logic of democratic decision-making, but its flaw is that 
only interested and well-organized groups participate, so that decisions cannot be said 
to reflect the common interest. Nor is the chance to participate always accepted; in the 
case of the European Water Initiative, for instance, some NGOs refused to participate 
because they rejected the very mandate of the negotiations, i.e., to devise viable forms 
of utility privatization, on normative grounds (Partzsch 2007). Kreide and Niederberger 
(2008) even argue that the binding power of the international legal order is deteriorat-
ing because it is increasingly created in negotiation between parties who pursue their 
particularistic interest. 
In consequence of such doubts, more radically minded International Relations scholars 
have turned from legitimacy based on legal procedures to legitimacy based on substan-
tively rational decision results, or output legitimacy. The democratic maxim of “rule 
by the people,” meaning that political decisions are derived from the preferences of the 
population in a chain of accountability linking those governing to those governed, is 
said to produce input legitimacy.3 Output legitimacy, in contrast, is derived from the 
capacity of a government or institution to solve collective problems and to meet the ex-
pectations of the governed citizens (Scharpf 1999: 16–20; Menon/Weatherill 2008: 401). 
The EU is held to be capable of legitimation by its output even if input legitimation is 
lacking, at least where policy is not about distribution or redistribution, but about ef-
fectively solving acknowledged problems (Majone 1996). Menon and Weatherill (2008) 
argue that the EU Commission and European Court of Justice (ECJ) provide legitimacy 
not only for the Union, but also for member states because they improve their problem-
solving effectiveness, given that many problems can no longer be solved within the con-
fines of single nation-states. In the prevalent version of output legitimation, democratic 
procedures are judged not to be necessary to produce substantively rational outcomes. 
3 The distinction between input and output legitimacy was made by Scharpf already in 1970, 
where the concepts are described more elaborately.
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In an even more critical argument, democracy is considered to be incapable to produce 
substantively rational policy outcomes.4 Mennon and Weatherill (2008: 407) even ar-
gue that insistence on (democratic) input legitimation could impair EU effectiveness, 
and hold “the independence and freedom from direct democratic accountability of the 
supranational authorities” to be crucial for the ability of European institutions to “carry 
out sensitive tasks of market regulation.” 
In the distinction between input and output legitimacy, the dual character of legal le-
gitimacy and the tenuous relation between its formal and material component finds its 
clearest expression. Historically, the idea that policies can be justified by their effective-
ness in solving collective problems and generating public goods5 is supported by the 
shift from stratification to functional differentiation as a basis of social order; in this 
process, performance has become the criterion of political legitimacy (Mayntz 1988). 
Yet output alone is not sufficient to constitute legal legitimacy. Decision procedure and 
decision output must both meet normative criteria, but they may be evaluated separate-
ly on the basis of different criteria. In practice, however, input and output legitimacy are 
connected. As the long and ultimately inconclusive discussion about what constitutes 
the “common good” makes evident, a consensual definition of a “substantively rational” 
policy is hard to come by. If there is disagreement about the desired policy output, a 
procedure is needed to settle disputes equitably. The very difficulty of defining what 
constitutes a legitimating output thus emphasizes the importance of input legitimacy. 
However defined, output legitimacy or the problem-solving capacity of political in-
stitutions depends in large part on expertise. A lay population lacks the expertise and 
information needed to formulate effective policies – this is a well-recognized drawback 
of democratic procedure. Experts do in fact play a crucial role not only in national, but 
also in transnational policy processes (Quack 2010). Assuming that, beyond the nation-
state, policy is concerned mainly with effective problem-solving rather than distributive 
issues, expertise should play a particularly important role in transnational governance. 
Especially in the EU, the combination of national representation and expert representa-
tion is evident, e.g., in comitology. Expert authority is often judged to be yet another 
form of rational legitimacy; Willke (2007: 47), for instance, mentions legitimacy based 
on expertise as a subtype of legal-rational legitimacy. In the same sense, Suchman (1995) 
speaks of “cognitive” legitimacy. This type of legitimacy is connected with the notion 
of Wissensgesellschaft and is reminiscent of the familiar distinction between authority 
of office (Amtsautorität) and expert authority (Fachautorität) claimed typically by pro-
4 This may be due to the cognitive incapability of finding a correct problem solution or to the lack 
of consensus about what would be the correct solution. If popular notions of a just order differ 
or are based on conflicting values, democratic procedures may not be able to arrive at decisions 
considered just by all. 
5 A similar idea is expressed by Rogowski (1974: 34), for whom a government enjoys rational 
legitimacy if it maximizes the expected utility of its citizens. Roughly similar is also Suchman’s 
(1995) concept of pragmatic legitimacy, accorded to policies that are responsive and a benefit to 
the interests of a group.
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fessionals and widely accepted by their clients. Rules for the use of technical appliances 
and prescription drugs need not justify their claim to be binding, i.e., to guide behavior, 
by reference to a democratic procedure; they must be comprehensible and objectively 
valid or causally correct. This quality is again the result of a specific procedure, i.e., of 
following the rules of scientific method. Decisions based on expertise can meet both 
procedural and substantive criteria of legitimacy, but these are not the same criteria that 
are used to evaluate a democratic polity. 
The Achilles heel of the concept of output legitimacy lies in the difficulty to distinguish 
empirically between consent based on the substantive rationality of policy decisions 
and consent based on interest, i.e., mere instrumental rationality. A policy output or 
decision that corresponds to self-interest (Weber’s Interessenlage) will obviously be ac-
cepted; the question is whether it also leads to an assessment of the policy as “just” or 
legitimate on the basis of the general values underlying it.6 Though this is often im-
plicitly assumed when the satisfaction with government or the trust in given political 
institutions is measured, approval of an existing order that is felt to grant one’s indi-
vidual well-being does not necessarily create the willingness to comply in cases where 
compliance is costly rather than beneficial; if this were not so, tax evasion would not be 
widespread. 
For Max Weber it would have been obvious that the perceived legitimacy of transna-
tional authorities and the “soft” and “hard” law they produce can have a mixture of 
different bases – input as well as output, participation and expertise as well as effective-
ness. This is argued at length by Neyer (2004). Baldwin and Cave (1999) have similarly 
used a set of five different criteria to assess the legitimacy of given regulations, includ-
ing procedural features, expertise, and effectiveness. In an attempt to enquire into the 
legitimacy of governance beyond the nation-state, Take (2009) was in fact able to show 
on the basis of empirical case studies that the belief in the legitimacy of a regime or 
institution, defined as reasoned acceptance (not compliance!), is in many cases related 
to a number of organizational and procedural characteristics, including participation, 
representativity, and due process. Where he found a regime to enjoy high acceptance 
in spite of the lack of these procedural prerequisites, its acceptance could be explained 
by the conformity of its goals to universal values, i.e., its substantive rationality. Once 
again these results show that legitimacy can be attributed both on the basis of formal 
and of material criteria; though causally connected in the normative concept of legal 
legitimacy, in practice the two need not come together. 
6 In opinion surveys, the satisfaction with government and with democracy and the trust in politi-
cal institutions, not legitimacy beliefs, are usually measured and shown to be related to socio-
economic indicators; for an example, see Schäfer (2010).
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4 Legitimacy and compliance
According to Max Weber, the belief in legitimacy, whatever its basis, is of functional 
importance for the stability of a political order. He considered the stabilizing effect of 
the belief in the legitimacy of an order to be decidedly superior to the stabilizing effect 
of self-interest and of behavior oriented at convention and tradition (Weber 1956: 23). 
Yet this is still a very limited claim: stability is a long-term concern and implies neither 
effectiveness nor short-term compliance. The accepted view in political science sounds 
more exacting: at least for a political order claiming popular support, the belief in its le-
gitimacy is important because it leads to voluntary compliance “with undesired rules or 
decisions of governing authority” (Scharpf 2009: 5). But how important are legitimacy 
beliefs for compliance in general? 
Max Weber never claimed that compliant behavior presupposes the belief in the legiti-
macy of an order. An empirical investigation of the bases of observable compliance 
would quickly show that the functional importance of legitimacy is easily overestimated. 
This may hold especially for legal legitimacy. If the belief in legitimacy means that deci-
sions going against the interest of an individual or group are voluntarily accepted, it 
may be easier for charismatic authority and time-hallowed tradition than for positive 
law to stabilize political orders, especially orders that assign inferior status to large seg-
ments of the population and demand sacrifice including even one’s life. However, in 
discussions of “compliance beyond the nation-state” (Zürn/Joerges 2005), legitimacy is 
usually equated with (some form of) legal legitimacy. But its relevance for compliance 
is recognized to be limited. Thus Zürn (2005: 26) doubts that “reservations about the 
normative validity of a rule” are “the most significant source of non-compliance.” At 
least in the short run, little legitimacy is needed to uphold a regime, legal or not, that is 
able to reward and to punish. 
In political practice, where corporate actors tend to choose their strategies deliberately, 
compliance is often a matter of interest. Asked whether organizations experience their 
regulatory environment as externally imposed constraints or as normative ideals and 
models for their own behavior, sociologists of law are said to tend toward the second 
answer, but political sociologists are doubtful (Edelman/ Stryker 2005: 538). In trans-
national governance it is mainly governments but also transnational corporations and 
organizations that are asked to comply. Empirical research on compliance in the EU 
suggests that member states comply primarily out of interest or ignore and try to evade 
EU directives.7 In Mastenbroek’s summary of the main explanatory factors put forward 
or tested in studies of compliance in the EU, legitimacy is explicitly mentioned but once, 
though there are some mentions (e.g., culture of compliance, support for Europe, or 
consensual democracy) that might be put into the same category (Mastenbroek 2005, 
table 1). The key hypothesis of this research had long been that compliance depends 
7 Admittedly, it is not always easy to distinguish between the preferences, or the “interest” of a gov-
ernment, and the substantive rationality of a policy, i.e., what would be its output legitimacy.
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mainly on the “goodness of fit” between EU policy requirements and existing institu-
tions at the national level. But, “the various case studies on the goodness of fit hypoth-
esis have pointed out the limited explanatory value of the hypothesis” (Mastenbroek 
2005: 1110). Instead, government preferences, domestic support and opposition, and 
supra- and international pressure are now seen to be decisive. In the comparative study 
by Falkner et al. (2005), it was found that, while in a few EU member countries the ob-
servance of EU law is highly valued and typically overrides domestic concerns, domestic 
interests prevailed in the majority of cases: compliance being high where the substan-
tive content of the Directive agreed with the policy preference of the government and 
major interest groups and low where it did not. This seems to be similar at the interna-
tional level. In his study of dispute settlement in GATT and WTO, Zangl (2006) finds 
that compliance results mainly from the fear that reputation will be damaged in the case 
of non-compliance and from the fear of the sanctions that GATT or WTO permit the 
claimant to use; a feeling of normative obligation towards the dispute settlement proce-
dure and its outcome turned out to be the least important compliance motive. 
Governance in Europe involves a compliance–legitimacy relationship between the 
Union and the member states, constrained by a compliance–legitimacy relationship 
between member governments and citizens (Scharpf 2009). Compliance motives are 
likely to differ between these two relationships, depending on whether governments, 
private corporate actors, or individuals are asked to comply. The same should hold for 
compliance with international rules. But ultimately the effectiveness of transnational 
norms depends on individual compliance. Though corporate actors are likely to choose 
more consciously than individuals in everyday situations between whether to comply 
or defect, individuals’ compliance with tacit and manifest rules is also often motivated 
by interest, either directly because one is rewarded or because compliance avoids nega-
tive sanctions. However, “rational choice deterrence models give a misleading picture 
of compliance” (Edelman/Stryker 2005: 539); legal sanctions in particular are often too 
small and come too late to count. Max Weber did not hold interest, i.e., the expectation 
of reward and fear of punishment, but habit to be the most frequent base of individual 
behavior. Literally he spoke of Eingelebtheit (Weber 1956: 23); this corresponds to the 
now frequently used concept of taken-for-grantedness.8 The functional importance of 
this behavioral orientation for the persistence of a given social order is likely to be con-
siderably greater than the belief in its legitimacy, especially in cases where a social order 
that should go against the interests of significant parts of the population appears to be 
stable. Hirschman (1986: 81) notes that history is full of cases where neither voice nor 
exit were observed, 
in spite of many reasons for discontent and unhappiness. There is no doubt, as many commen-
tators have pointed out, that passivity, acquiescence, inaction, withdrawal, and resignation have 
held sway much of the time over wide areas of the social world.
8 While Weber clearly distinguished the taken-for-grantedness of an order from the belief in its 
legitimacy, an emphasis on compliance can lead to conflating both; thus Suchmann (1995) 
considers taken-for-grantedness as one among several types of legitimacy.
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Strategies of adaptation and avoidance, of bending rules, making use of legal loopholes, 
and “making the best” of situations seem often preferred to voice and exit, both of 
which are costly. But the most powerful psychological mechanism underlying unques-
tioning compliance is probably the adaptation of the level of aspiration to the chances 
of satisfaction, which makes that deficits are accepted without protest, and even mis-
erable situations are defined as “normal.” Anyone who has lived through a war knows 
that “objectively” unbearable situations can come to be considered normal, are taken for 
granted and adapted to – just as one adapts to a hostile natural environment or to “fate.”9 
In the long run, however, taken-for-grantedness is an instable base of compliance; it can 
be punctured by the knowledge of, or even the mere belief in alternatives. Not day-to-
day compliance, but the long-term stability of a political order is more safely based on 
legitimacy beliefs. 
Legitimacy beliefs appear to be of minor short-run importance for the compliance of 
individual and of corporate actors. Why then should legitimacy be discussed so consist-
ently in relation to transnational governance? The presumably deleterious weakness of 
legitimacy in transnational governance is not an empirical conclusion from research; 
it is a judgment derived from a – strongly normative – political philosophy. A world 
in which responsibly acting autonomous persons realize shared values is the perennial 
ideal of political philosophy. Exit and voice are reactions of self-reliant actors – habit 
and passive tolerance are not. It is the normative philosophical stance of political scien-
tists that makes them enquire into legitimacy, rather than their empirical interest in the 
sources of compliance. 
9 This mechanism, of course, also makes a life in luxury appear “normal” and something that is 
taken for granted; “normal” can be both good or bad, not only in the eyes of the beholder but 
also in the perception of the individual concerned.
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